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Abstract
In the Internet era, online social media emerged as the main tool for sharing opinions and information
among individuals. In this work we study an adaptive model of a social network where directed links
connect users with similar tastes, and over which information propagates through social recommendation.
Agent-based simulations of two different artificial settings for modeling user tastes are compared with
patterns seen in real data, suggesting that users differing in their scope of interests is a more realistic
assumption than users differing only in their particular interests. We further introduce an extensive set
of similarity metrics based on users’ past assessments, and evaluate their use in the given social recom-
mendation model with both artificial simulations and real data. Superior recommendation performance
is observed for similarity metrics that give preference to users with small scope—who thus act as selective
filters in social recommendation.
Keywords: Taste similarity, agent-based modeling, adaptive complex networks, information diffusion
and filtering, social recommendation.
1 Introduction
Online social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Digg, and others) are nowadays popular media which allow opin-
ions and information to spread rapidly to friends, friends of friends, and further, eventually reaching a huge
audience by cascading chains of influences [1, 2]. Furthermore, they are able to reflect moods and current
beliefs of people, giving early signs of what is just going to happen [3, 4]. The study of the structure and
evolution of social networks has hence attracted much more attention than in the past, becoming a main
focus of complexity science. To this end, agent-based models (ABM) represent an ideal tool for simulating
the social behavior of autonomous individuals and the interactions among them [5], and have been success-
fully used to model decentralized scenarios where individual interactions lead to the emergence of collective
patterns [6, 7]. When modeling social networks however one should be aware that they differ from other kind
of complex systems because of two features: taste affinity and social influence between users. Taste affinity
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(also named homophily or selection in the literature) is the tendency of individuals to form relationships
with others who posses similar characteristics [8]. Social influence is the process which leads people to adopt
behaviors exhibited by those they interact with [9]. Taste affinity and social influence not surprisingly lead
to correlation between actions of adjacent nodes in the network, and hence are nowadays widely recognized
to play a fundamental role in the formation and evolution of social systems [10, 11].
In this work we focus on taste affinity between users. While past studies of homophily in online social
network have been based on the analysis of emotionally annotated data [12, 13, 14], here we build our study
on the adaptive model of social recommendation introduced in [15, 16]. The model consists of a network
of users, each connected to other users who represent her information sources—which we name the user’s
leaders. Users in the community interact with some kind of content—we use news here, but they can be
also movies, books, bookmarks, and so on. The propagation of a news over the network starts from the
user who uploads it to the system and then automatically forwards it to her followers—the users who have
chosen her as leader. If one of these followers later likes the news, it will be similarly passed further to this
user’s followers, and so on. This social spreading/filtering mechanism is known as social recommendation,
and it is based on the evidence that users prefer recommendations made by friends rather than those by a
centralized system [17, 18]. Simultaneously with the propagation of news, connections of the leader-follower
network can change when, for any user, a leader better than her current ones is found. The quality of the
candidate leader is estimated by comparing the users’ past assessments to obtain their taste similarity. Due
to this mechanism, the evolution of the social network and the dynamical processes taking place on the
network become coupled, as it happens in real social communities [19, 20]. This gives rise to a rich variety
of features, for instance the emergence of a “good get richer” mechanism which leads to scale-free leadership
structures—again observed in real social networks [21, 22].
To study the evolution and dynamics of the system, we first turn to computer simulations and introduce a
general agent-based framework for describing users’ tastes. We build on the assumption that users’ tastes
and news’ attributes can be represented by vectors, and that the assessment of a user on a news depends
on the overlap between the respective vectors. A fundamental issue is hence how to construct these vectors.
Usually one takes inspiration from real data, where dimensionality reduction techniques (Singular Value
Decomposition, Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis and Latent Dirichlet Allocation) can be employed to
extract analogous features from the given data [23]. However the result of this approach strongly depends
both on the number of used hidden variables and, more importantly, on the particular dataset analyzed.
Here we take the opposite approach: instead of seeking for a perfect model of users’ interests, we study
the system under two different plausible models of users’ tastes. We then apply our social recommendation
model to real data and determine which taste model better describes reality.
The way of modeling users’ tastes determines users’ actions and, at last, the behavior of the whole sys-
tem. However taste vectors are hidden variables both in our model and in reality. We hence tackle the
opposite issue as well: given the users’ actions, how to quantify users’ taste similarity? In the literature,
there are a number of definitions for taste similarity based on users’ assessment: the probability of agreement,
the cosine similarity, the Jaccard coefficient, the Pearson correlation coefficient, to give a few examples, and
each definition is apt for a particular setting. For instance, Jaccard’s works with implicit ratings, whereas
Pearson’s exploits explicit assessments. Assuming that users may like, dislike or not rate an item, we make
a comparative study of a number of similarity metrics. We use both simulations and real data to determine
which of them are better for building an efficient leader-follower network for social recommendation. We
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show that using a well-chosen definition of the similarity can significantly enhance the quality of the produced
recommendations, and ultimately improve users’ satisfaction.
To summarize, our contribution is twofold: 1) we study two different ABMs for social systems built upon
plausible assumptions about users’ tastes, determining which one is closer to reality, and 2) we identify a set
of similarity metrics which are suitable to measure taste affinity, and which can be used to obtain quality
recommendations both in simulations (under different ABM assumptions) and in real case studies. The rest
of the work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model for social recommendation along
with different ways of modeling users’ tastes and measuring taste similarity. Section 3 contains results of
agent-based simulations, whereas Section 4 presents results obtained on real datasets. Conclusions are given
in Section 5.
2 The Model
We now describe the social recommendation model originally introduced in [15].
Notation. We denote as U the total number of users, L the number of leaders assigned to each user and
si|j the estimated similarity of reading tastes of user i with respect to those of user j—obtained from i’s and
j’s assessments of news (see Sec. 2.1). Evaluation of news α by user i (eiα) can be either +1 (liked), −1
(disliked) or 0 (not rated yet). The model assumes no other information than ratings of news by users.
Network structure. The set of U users is represented as a monopartite social network, in which each user
i is connected by directed links to L other users who represent i’s leaders (information sources). Conversely,
users who have i as a leader are referred to as followers of i. Thus, a directed edge points from j to i (j → i)
if user j is a leader of user i or, equivalently, i is a follower of j.
News spreading. The directed leader-follower network serves as the basis for news propagation. When
user k introduces news α to the system, the news is automatically passed to all followers of k. For follower
j, the social recommendation score of news α is set proportional to j’s similarity with the news’s submitter:
Rjα ∝ sj|k (the higher the sj|k, the stronger the recommendation). If α is later approved by user j, it is
similarly passed further to all users i who are followers of j with recommendation score proportional to their
similarity with j: Riα ∝ si|j . If α is approved by one of users i, it is passed further to i’s followers, and so
forth. Note that if a user receives the same news from multiple leaders, the news’s recommendation score
becomes proportional to the sum of the similarity scores between this user and the leaders who forwarded
it, reflecting that a news approved by several leaders is more likely to be approved by this user too. Finally,
to allow fresh news to be accessed fast, recommendation scores are damped with time with a function
(1− τ−1)t−tα , where t represents the current time, tα is the time news α was introduced in the system, and
τ is the time scale of the decay. Summing up, for a generic user i at time t the recommendation score for
news α is:
Riα(t) = (1− τ
−1)t−tα
∑
j∈Li
si|j δejα,1 (1)
Here Li is the set of leaders of user i and the term δejα ,1 is one when user j liked news α (ejα = 1) and zero
otherwise (δ is the Kronecker symbol). Recommendation scores are used to sort the unread news each user
receives (high scores at the top).
Leaders updating. Simultaneously with the propagation of news, connections of the leader-follower net-
work are rewired when, for any user, a leader better than her current ones is found. In practice this means
that if j is the leader of i with the lowest similarity value, j is replaced with a new user k if si|k > si|j (link
j → i is cut and k → i is created). As selection strategy for picking new candidate leaders, we employ a
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so-called Hybrid rewiring [24], which is composed 90% of LL+F local rewiring (k is chosen from the leaders’
leaders and the followers of user i such that si|k is maximized) and 10% of random rewiring (k is simply
a user picked at random from all users). This rewiring mechanism mimics the natural evolution of social
communities where users search for friends among friends of friends (local rewiring) but also casual encoun-
ters occur and may lead to long-term relationships (random rewiring). By construction, the Hybrid rewiring
naturally enhances both the link reciprocity [25] and the clustering coefficient [26] of the social network [24].
In addition, it was shown to represent an optimal compromise between complexity and efficiency [24]. Of
course, there are more sophisticated models of network evolution, which are based on statistical methods to
estimate the model’s parameters from empirical data [27, 28]. However, since it is not our goal to model
a particular network, we stick on simple and general evolution rules—which nevertheless were shown to
produce network topologies with high values of link reciprocity and clustering coefficient, which thus closely
resemble the topologies of real social communities [24].
2.1 User Similarity
An essential ingredient of the model is the estimated similarity of users’ reading tastes, which regulates the
news’ flow over the system by determining the leaders’ selection from users (i.e., the link structure of the
network) and recommendation scores of news. Since we can rely only on users’ ratings, the similarity of
a pair of users has to be estimated from their assessments on news—which in our case can be either like,
dislike, or not rated.
The first similarity measure that we consider, first introduced in [15], is the overall probability of agree-
ment between users i and j. If li = {α|eiα = 1} and di = {α|ejα = −1} are respectively the set of news liked
and disliked by user i, then:
s
(0)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |+ |di
⋂
lj |+ |li
⋂
dj |
(2)
where the denominator is the total number of news read by both i and j. We then consider the Jaccard co-
efficient, which however only works with binary ratings. By considering only like instances (i.e., disregarding
dislikes) we get:
J
(0)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
(3)
which represent the ratio of the number of news liked by both i and j over the number of news liked by
either of them. The opposite procedure (disregarding likes) gives:
J˜
(0)
i|j :=
|di
⋂
dj |
|di
⋃
dj |
(4)
We have tested this similarity and obtained poor results (not reported in this paper), which is not surprising.
The social recommendation mechanism is in fact based on users’ filtering: leaders forward to their followers
only the news they like. This means that a news liked by leader j is always passed to follower i, who will
possibly evaluate it. However if j does not like a news, i does not receive it directly1 and it is less likely
1In principle, i could still receive the news from another leader; however, such leader has to receive the news first, and then
like and forward it. This longer path is hindered both by the time-damping of recommendation scores and by the eventuality
that leaders of the same user have similar tastes among themselves.
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that i will ever evaluate it. For this reason, the sets |li
⋂
lj | and |di
⋂
lj | are much larger than |di
⋂
dj | and
|li
⋂
dj |, and a similarity score based on either of the first sets is much more reliable in measuring taste
affinity than a score based on either of the second sets. Hence in what follows we will not consider measures
based only on |di
⋂
dj | or |li
⋂
dj |.
Coming back to J (0), we do not expect it to work better than s(0) because it exploits less information.
We instead use J (0) as a baseline for introducing other similarity metrics:
J
(1)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
+
|di
⋂
dj |
|di
⋃
dj |
(5)
J
(2)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
−
|di
⋂
lj |
|di
⋃
lj |
(6)
J
(3)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
−
|li
⋂
dj |
|li
⋃
dj |
(7)
(8)
Note that s(0), J (0) and J (1) are symmetric measures: s
(0)
i|j ≡ s
(0)
j|i , J
(0)
i|j ≡ J
(0)
j|i and J
(1)
i|j ≡ J
(1)
j|i . Instead J
(2)
and J (3) are not symmetric—what happens is that J
(2)
j|i ≡ J
(3)
i|j and vice versa. Since our network is directed
(allowing for situations where j is a good leader for i but not the contrary), considering asymmetric similarity
scores is more than appropriate. We pursue this direction further by introducing asymmetric equivalents of
s(0) and of J (0):
s
(0L)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |
|lj |+ |dj |
(9)
s
(0F )
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |
|li|+ |di|
(10)
J
(0L)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
(11)
J
(0F )
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|li|
(12)
Here s
(0L)
i|j (s
(0F )
i|j ) is the probability of follower i and leader j agreeing on the news assessed by leader j
(follower i), whereas J
(0L)
i|j (J
(0F )
i|j ) is the probability of follower i (leader j) liking a news liked by leader j
(follower i). Asymmetry here translates into s
(0L)
j|i ≡ s
(0F )
i|j and J
(0L)
j|i ≡ J
(0F )
i|j .
We finally consider asymmetric measures which, as for J (1), J (2) and J (3), combine the sets li, lj, di,
dj as separate algebraic contributions. There are many possibilities to construct such similarities but as we
said before, news liked by leader j are the ones which are recommended to follower i: it makes more sense
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to use the probability of i liking a news liked by j. For this reason, we build on J
(0L)
i|j and introduce:
K
(1L)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj|
+
|di
⋂
dj |
|dj |
(13)
K
(1F )
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj|
+
|di
⋂
dj |
|di|
(14)
K
(2L)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj|
−
|di
⋂
lj |
|lj |
(15)
K
(2F )
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj|
−
|di
⋂
lj |
|di|
(16)
K
(3L)
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj|
−
|li
⋂
dj |
|dj |
(17)
K
(3F )
i|j :=
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj|
−
|li
⋂
dj |
|li|
(18)
The meaning of each definition is straightforward: K
(1L)
i|j is equal to J
(0L)
i|j plus the probability of follower i
disliking a news disliked by leader j; K
(2F )
i|j is equal to J
(0L)
i|j minus the probability of leader j liking a news
disliked by follower i; and so forth. We remark that this list of similarities is not intended to be exhaustive.
2 Instead, we considered various definitions containing all the combinations of the sets li, lj , di, dj which
are meaningful in our opinion and have the potential to achieve a reasonably good performance.
Table 1 gives a summary of the similarity metrics that we introduced above. Note that all definitions
of the similarity are prone to statistical fluctuations when the set of news considered for the assessment is
small, i.e. when the denominator of an algebraic term is small. Since in a sampling of n trials the typical
relative fluctuation is of the order of 1/n, we multiply each separate term of all introduced similarities by
a factor (1 − n−1/2), where n is the denominator of the considered term. Such factor disadvantages user
pairs with a small n. Finally, when we do not have enough evaluation for a user pair (meaning that their
similarity is undefined) we set it to a small positive value s0, reflecting the fact that even when there are no
users’ evaluations, there is some base similarity of their interests.
2.2 Agent-Based Validation of the Model
For simulating the model, we use the following agent-based framework.
Users’ activity and News’ diffusion. In each time step of the simulation, a given user is active with
probability pA. When active, a user reads the top R news from her recommendation list, immediately
forwarding the ones she likes to her followers; in addition, with probability pS she submits a new piece of
news. Users have a limited receiving capability: if the number of recommended news becomes greater than
the maximum users’ stack length S, the news with lowest score is removed from the recommendation list.
2There are many other ways to assess users’ similarities from the user-object bipartite graph and the user-user social graph:
the generalized model of relational similarity [29], blockmodeling [30], the CONCOR algorithm [31], automorphic equivalence
[32], Correspondence Analysis [33], and many others. However, these methods require as input the whole dataset of users and
objects, also to evaluate the similarity of a single user pair, and are much demanding in terms of computational cost. For
this reason, they are not applicable in practice to online social networks with millions of users and continuously generated
content—and thus have not been considered in our analysis.
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Table 1: List of similarity metrics.
symbol formula
s
(0)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |+ |di
⋂
lj|+ |li
⋂
dj |
J
(0)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
J
(1)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
+
|di
⋂
dj |
|di
⋃
dj |
J
(2)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
−
|di
⋂
lj |
|di
⋃
lj |
J
(3)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|li
⋃
lj |
−
|li
⋂
dj |
|li
⋃
dj |
s
(0L)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |
|lj |+ |dj |
s
(0F )
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |+ |di
⋂
dj |
|li|+ |di|
J
(0L)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
J
(0F )
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|li|
K
(1L)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
+
|di
⋂
dj |
|dj |
K
(1F )
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
+
|di
⋂
dj |
|di|
K
(2L)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
−
|di
⋂
lj |
|lj |
K
(2F )
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
−
|di
⋂
lj |
|di|
K
(3L)
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
−
|li
⋂
dj |
|dj |
K
(3F )
i|j
|li
⋂
lj |
|lj |
−
|li
⋂
dj |
|li|
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Users’ network and Links’ rewiring. At any moment, the leaders of each user j should be those L users
who have the highest taste similarity with j. Lacking any prior information, we assume random initial
assignment of leaders. As the system gathers more evaluations from users, the quality of leaders can be
assessed through the similarity metric, and links can be rewired (with the described hybrid strategy) in
order to connect users to their best leaders. Rewiring of the links takes place after every u time steps.
Users’ tastes and News’ attributes. To model users’ judgments of read news we use a vector model where
tastes of user i are represented by a D-dimensional taste vector ~ti = (t
1
i , . . . , t
D
i ) and attributes of news α
are represented by a D-dimensional attribute vector ~aα = (a
1
α, . . . , a
D
α ). Similar vector models are often used
in semantic approaches to recommendation [34]. Opinion of user i about news α is based on the overlap of
the user’s tastes and the news’s attributes, which can be expressed by the scalar product
Ωiα = ~ti · ~aα (19)
We assume that user i approves news α (eiα = +1) only when Ωiα ≥ ∆; the news is disapproved otherwise
(eiα = −1). Here ∆ is the users’ approval threshold: the higher it is, the more demanding the users are. To
set the taste/attribute vectors, we use two different approaches.
• Homogeneous setting. Each user has preference for DA out of D available tastes—that means, each
taste vector has DA elements equal to one (active tastes) and the remaining D−DA elements equal to
zero. There are
(
D
DA
)
such vectors and hence we set the number of users in our system to U =
(
D
DA
)
, all
having mutually different taste vectors. Note that the taste vectors of two users differ at least in two
elements, we thus define as taste-mates users with exactly two different taste vector elements. We also
assume that the attributes of a created news α are identical with the tastes of the user i who submits
it (~aα ≡ ~ti).
• Heterogeneous setting. Each user has preference for a variable number of the D available tastes—each
vector has a different number of elements equal to one (active tastes) and the remaining elements are
zero. Here users differ not only by their particular tastes, but also by the scope of their interests—
which, for a user i, is defined as hi :=
∑D
k=1 t
k
i and represents the number of her active tastes, i.e., the
area covered by her interests.3 There are 2D possible taste vectors and hence in principle we would
set U = 2D to have all mutually different taste vectors, with taste-mates now defined as users having
only one different vector element. However in this scenario we are also considering users who like or
dislike everything (i.e., the users with taste vectors of all ones or zeros, respectively). Hence in order
to be more consistent and closer to life, we only consider the users whose taste vectors have a scope
DA ≤ h ≤ D−DA. This reduces the effective number of users to U = 2
D − 2
∑DA−1
d=0
(
D
d
)
. We finally
assume that each news’ attribute vector has a fixed number DA of active attributes (number of ones),
which are randomly chosen among the active tastes of the user who submits it.
Parameters values used in all following simulations are listed in Table 2. For a discussion on how these
parameters may affect simulation results, see [24].
3hi ≡ DA ∀i in the homogeneous setting: each user has the same number of active tastes. To better illustrate the difference
between taste (or interest) and scope of interests (or, simply, scope), consider user i who has preference for news about politics
and economics, and user j who instead prefers news about economics, technology and science. Then the tastes of i are exactly
politics and economics, and we can say that i and j have the same taste for economics (they are both interested in it) and, for
instance, for sport (they are both not interested in it). The scope of user i is instead equal to two, as she has preference for two
kind of news), and the scope of j is three. We can thus say that i has smaller scope than j, and that j has bigger scope than i.
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Table 2: List of parameters used in simulations.
symbol value
Homogeneous setting:
Number of users U 3003
Dimension of taste vectors D 14
Number of active tastes DA 6
Users’ approval threshold ∆ 4
Heterogeneous setting:
Number of users U 3498
Dimension of taste vectors D 12
Minimum number of active tastes DA 4
Users’ approval threshold ∆ 3
Common parameters:
Number of leaders per user L 10
Probability of being active pA 0.05
Probability of submitting a news pS 0.02
Number of news read when active R 3
Length of recommendation list S 50
Period of the rewiring u 10
Damping factor for time decay τ 10
Initial value of the similarity s0 10
−7
2.3 Measures of the System’s Properties
We measure a number of quantities to describe the leader-follower network and the performance of the social
recommender system:
• Leadership Structure, measured by the cumulative distribution F (k) = P (f > k), where f is the
number of a user’ followers.
• Number of dead ends (de) in the network, i.e. of users with no followers (f = 0). We are interested
in this quantity as, by definition, the news which are uploaded or liked by dead ends cannot spread to
any other users, hence having many dead ends leads to a waste of user input and significantly reduces
the diversity of news propagating over the network.
• Link reciprocity, the tendency of node pairs to form connections between each other. It is defined as
the ratio of the number of bi-directed links to the total number of links in the network:
r :=
∑
ij aijaji∑
ij aij
• Average differences. In a computer simulation we have the luxury of knowing users’ taste vectors and
hence we can compute in how many elements the taste vector of a user differs from the taste vector of
her leader. By averaging over all users and all their leaders we obtain the average number of differences
ad := 1UL
∑
i
∑
l∈Li
‖~ti − ~tl‖1. The fewer are the differences, the better is the assignment of leaders
and the better the network has adapted to users’ tastes.
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• Recommendation efficiency. When making recommendations, it is possible to fall into two different
kinds of error: recommending content that users does not like, and not recommending content that
users does like. These errors are known respectively as false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN). To
complete the picture, true positives (TP) are recommendations of content that users does like, and true
negatives (TN) are lacks of recommendation of content that user does not like [35]. These quantities
can be used to assess the quality of recommendations by measuring:
1. Precision p := TPTP+FP
2. Recall 1− β := TPTP+FN
It is important to remark that in our model these quantities strongly depend on L, the number of
leaders per user: big values of L imply more recommendations, which can have the effect of decreasing
p and increasing 1− β, and vice versa.
3 Results of agent-based simulations
In this section we present the results of agent-based simulations of the social recommendation model. We first
check if the system is able to improve the leader-follower network from its initial random configuration. Figure
1 shows the average differences at different times steps of the network’s evolution for both homogeneous and
heterogeneous settings. For readability reasons, we only report the evolution of the system under some of the
definitions of the similarity measure (those, as will be discussed later, that are best performing). We observe
that the average differences are gradually improved in the system, meaning that users are able to find better
leaders—whatever the definition of the similarity. After an equilibration period, the system converges to a
stationary network configuration (whose properties are reported in table 3). The quality of the equilibrium
state can be assessed as follows:
• In the homogeneous setting, taste-mates differ in exactly two taste vector elements: the lowest possible
value of the average differences is two, which corresponds to a globally optimal assignment of leaders in
the network. Hence the quality of the final state can be estimated by how close the average differences
are to two. Note that as for each user there are N = DA(D −DA) taste-mates, the optimal state is
unique only if L = N . If L < N , there are different possible optimal states, which are determined
by initial conditions and users’ dynamics. If L > N (which however is not our case), the average
differences are more than two even in the optimal state.
• In the heterogeneous setting, taste-mates differ instead in only one taste vector element, and the lowest
possible value of the average differences is hence one. In a situation where U = 2D, there would be D
taste-mates for each user, hence the optimal state would be unique if L = D, whereas if L < D there
would be different optimal states, and finally if L > D the average differences would be greater than one
even in the optimal state. However we are considering here only users with DA ≤ h ≤ D −DA, hence
users with h = DA or h = D−DA only have D−DA taste-mates. Since we have set D−DA < L < D,
we do not expect the average differences to ever reach one. In addition, we notice that here the number
of taste-mates for each user is smaller compared to the homogeneous setting, hence getting close to the
optimal state is more difficult. Finally, whereas in the homogeneous case the notion of taste-mates is
simple, here we still have to investigate whether a good leader should have more or less active tastes
than her followers—that would again reduce the number of available good leaders for each user.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the average differences in the system for the homogeneous (a) and the heterogeneous
(b) settings, and for some representative definitions of the similarity measure.
Figure 1 shows that in both settings, with s(0) the system reaches the lowest average differences. With J (0L),
which only considers likes, one obtains the poorest performance—but the stationary state is not far from the
optimal one. Using additional terms as in K(2L) and K(2F ) brings the system very close to the final state of
s(0). The stationary values of the average differences for these and other similarities are reported in table 3.
Moving further, we investigate the leadership structure (figure 2) and the properties of the network at
equilibrium, as well as the performance of the recommender system (table 3). As it was natural to expect,
in the homogeneous setting the stationary degree distribution is rather homogeneous (with very few dead
ends) and the reciprocity is high, whatever the definition of the similarity. The only exception is J (0F ): here
users who happen to have few likes are not favored as leaders (li
⋂
lj is not necessarily small compared to lj ,
but it is small compared to an average li), so they start to lose followers and the news they forward reach
only a few users; this in turns causes li
⋂
lj to remain small while li grows, so they again lose attractiveness,
and so forth. As a results, these users end up with no followers. About the recommender system’s perfor-
mance, using s(0) (the best for average differences) yields the highest recall, whereas using K(2L) and K(2F )
the highest precision. Moreover, all similarities highlighted in the table are better than the others both in
precision and recall.
Things become more interesting in the heterogeneous setting. Here the stationary degree distribution has a
longer tail (as it happens in many real systems) and the reciprocity is generally lower with respect to the
homogeneous case. s(0) is still the best for average differences and recall, and the resulting network is again
rather homogeneous (low de and high r), whereas K(2L) and K(2F ) have still the best precision (the gap
with respect to s(0) increases here). However, for K(2F ) the recall drops significantly, and this is caused by
high de ratio. In this case, users with many likes are not favored (di
⋂
lj is usually smaller than lj, but can
be as big as an average di causing a −1 contribution to the similarity) and end up with no followers.
4 The
4This feature only appears in the heterogeneous setting which consists of users who by construction like more news than the
others. In the homogeneous setting, a similar situation may arise only because of fluctuations which are however tamed by the
first term |li
⋂
lj |/|lj |.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions of the number of users’ followers at equilibrium for the ho-
mogeneous (a) and the heterogeneous (b) setting, and for some representative definitions of the similarity
measure.
Table 3: Properties of the network at equilibrium and performance of the recommender system (results are
averaged over independent realizations). Values of de, p and 1− β are percentages. Note that the precision
values in the two settings have as reference values the precisions of recommending at random, which are
15.6% and 29.6% in the homogeneous and heterogeneous setting, respectively.
homogeneous setting heterogeneous setting
ad r de p 1− β ad r de p 1− β
s(0) 2.05 0.67 0.5 45.8 36.9 1.72 0.63 0.6 61.5 21.9
J (0) 3.08 0.73 0.3 39.0 16.8 2.73 0.67 1.1 50.2 10.3
J (1) 3.33 0.71 0.7 35.9 10.9 2.81 0.66 1.2 47.8 9.5
J (2) 2.46 0.80 0.0 46.0 29.4 2.03 0.64 1.6 59.2 14.9
J (3) 2.53 0.49 4.3 41.7 20.4 2.09 0.49 6.9 50.4 11.6
s(0L) 4.61 0.59 5.5 28.6 4.6 3.19 0.62 2.4 47.8 9.0
s(0F ) 3.76 0.66 1.3 30.9 7.3 2.62 0.60 2.8 51.1 10.1
J (0L) 2.91 0.76 0.2 42.3 22.5 2.40 0.46 10.8 59.8 12.5
J (0F ) 3.05 0.24 35.6 35.6 6.2 2.55 0.10 62.3 35.5 5.8
K(1L) 3.12 0.71 0.5 36.5 14.3 2.55 0.59 2.1 52.4 12.8
K(1F ) 3.20 0.68 1.7 38.0 16.9 2.46 0.30 33.5 59.0 7.6
K(2L) 2.29 0.81 0.1 47.7 33.9 2.02 0.47 7.0 66.3 19.3
K(2F ) 2.36 0.77 0.4 46.8 32.9 2.21 0.17 38.9 66.7 11.3
K(3L) 2.43 0.53 0.9 44.0 25.7 2.01 0.54 1.3 59.9 17.8
K(3F ) 2.44 0.45 5.4 42.9 21.9 2.07 0.60 3.6 56.0 14.7
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Table 4: Pearson correlation coefficients c(∆t,s) and c(∆h,s) between ∆t or ∆h and s for leader-follower pairs
in equilibrium networks. The left column refers to the homogeneous setting (where ∆hi|j = 0 ∀i, j), the
other two columns to the heterogeneous one.
c(∆t,s) c(∆t,s) c(∆h,s)
s(0) -0.68 -0.30 0.00
J (0) -0.29 -0.26 -0.01
J (1) -0.17 -0.21 -0.00
J (2) -0.40 -0.33 -0.13
J (3) -0.36 -0.38 0.20
s(0L) -0.05 -0.19 -0.05
s(0F ) -0.13 -0.25 0.03
J (0L) -0.36 -0.39 -0.14
J (0F ) -0.37 -0.44 0.35
K(1L) -0.20 -0.28 0.03
K(1F ) -0.24 -0.36 -0.31
K(2L) -0.46 -0.42 -0.33
K(2F ) -0.47 -0.45 -0.51
K(3L) -0.42 -0.42 0.05
K(3F ) -0.40 -0.34 0.02
same happens for K(1F ) (for users with few dislikes, di
⋂
dj is not necessary small compared to dj , but it is
small compared to an average di) and again for J
(0F ).
Note that among the basic asymmetric indices, J (0L) performs remarkably better than s(0L) and s(0F )—
despite using only likes, and as expected it is better than J (0F ). This justifies using J (0L) for building the set
of K similarities, with the result of K(2L) and K(2F ) further increasing precision and recall in the system.
Again, we can explain why these two metrics outstand the other Ks: K(2L) and K(2F ) are the only to feature
in the second term the set lj , which is the most informative to consider as it contains all the news j passes
to i—which determine i’s satisfaction, and hence the quality of the recommendation process.
We now investigate further the role of various users in the heterogeneous setting. In particular, we con-
sider each leader-follower pair in the system and define their taste-vector difference ∆tij = ‖~ti−~tj‖ and their
scope difference ∆hi|j = hj − hi. We then study which pairs are favored by the used similarity measure by
computing the Pearson correlation coefficients c(∆t,s) (between ∆t and s) and c(∆h,s) (between ∆h and s).
Table 4 shows these values, together with c(∆t,s) for the homogeneous setting as a benchmark.
As expected, in the homogeneous setting all c(∆t,s) are negative: s and ∆t are anticorrelated, i.e., the smaller
the difference, the higher the similarity. s(0) yields the highest c in absolute value, followed by K(2L) and
K(2F ). We see that the ability to distinguish users’ pairs with different ∆t is directly related to final average
differences and system’s performance (table 3).
In the heterogeneous setting, c(∆t,s) values are still negative and very close to the ones of the previous
setting—with the exception of s(0) whose c is halved. With respect to c(∆h,s), as expected, symmetric
measures cannot distinguish ∆hi|j from ∆hj|i, hence we obtain no correlation in this case. J
(0F ) favors
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Table 5: Pearson correlation coefficients of h with f , p and 1− β in the heterogeneous setting.
ch,f ch,p ch,1−β
s(0) 0.18 0.96 -0.33
J (0) -0.26 0.89 -0.72
J (1) -0.27 0.89 -0.54
J (2) -0.62 0.94 -0.84
J (3) 0.47 0.92 -0.80
s(0L) 0.04 0.93 0.15
s(0F ) 0.06 0.93 -0.01
J (0L) -0.74 0.91 -0.85
J (0F ) 0.49 0.96 -0.48
K(1L) -0.56 0.92 -0.62
K(1F ) -0.74 0.92 -0.75
K(2L) -0.74 0.92 -0.93
K(2F ) -0.73 0.91 -0.89
K(3L) -0.15 0.93 -0.88
K(3F ) 0.12 0.92 -0.86
instead users with higher h (more likes, as explained before). For other metrics, we generally observe a weak
correlation, with some important exceptions: J (2), J (0L), K(1F ), K(2L) and K(2F ), ordered by increasing
anticorrelation. These metrics are able to distinguish user pairs with different scopes and favor users with
smaller scope as leaders, which then leads to superior recommendations (table 3).
To show that this is the case, consider a user pair with ∆tij small and hi > hj ⇒ ∆hi|j < 0 : users i and j
have very similar tastes, but j is slightly more demanding than i. Since j is i’s leader, in the news spreading
process j blocks all the news she dislikes so that i will like almost all the news that she gets from j. This
means that j is a good leader for i as she forwards only the news matching i’s tastes. If we do not consider
missing evaluations, this situation can be roughly described as |li
⋂
lj | ≃ |lj |, |di
⋂
lj| ≃ 0, |li
⋂
dj | 6= 0,
|di
⋂
dj | ≃ |di| < |dj |. The opposite case hi < hj is instead not favorable for i as in this case her leader j
could also forward news that i would not like (as j is less demanding than i). Here |li
⋂
lj| ≃ |li| < |lj |,
|di
⋂
lj | 6= 0, |li
⋂
dj | ≃ 0, |di
⋂
dj | ≃ |dj | < |di|. The situation is not symmetric and that is why the
reciprocity coefficient in the heterogeneous setting drops. Given these two cases, J (0L) favors the first one
as by definition, J
(0L)
i|j ≃ 1 if hi > hj but J
(0L)
j|i ≡ J
(0F )
i|j < 1 if hi < hj . The other K metrics are built from
J (0L) by introducing additional terms. These terms for K(0L), K(0F ) and, in lesser degree,5 K(1F ) promote
the first case (and hence users’ satisfaction) even more, whereas the terms for K(1L), K(3L) and K(3F ) go in
the opposite direction: the corresponding overall c(∆h,s) becomes close to zero and users’ satisfaction lowers
significantly. The system’s behavior hence strongly depends on the particular similarity definition used.
In addition we study how individual users’ features depend on the scopes of interests h. Table 5 reports the
Pearson correlation coefficients of h with f (number of users’ followers), p and 1− β (precision/recall of the
recommendations for the user). Concerning the number of followers, users with small h (more demanding)
5We already discussed that the term |di
⋂
dj | is not the most reliable for computing similarity.
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Figure 3: Probability distributions for individual users’ precision (upper panels) and recall (lower panels)
values for the homogeneous [(a),(c)] and the heterogeneous [(b),(d)] settings.
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become popular leaders when using J (2), J (0L), K(1F ), K(2L) and K(2F ), as expected from the previous
discussion. This feature is still present when using K(1L) and K(3L), as in these cases the effect of the
damping terms (the ones in parenthesis) is to favor users with many dislikes, i.e. with small h. For s(0)
instead the correlation is small but positive: users with high h are slightly favored as their bad filtering
ability is not penalized enough by a symmetric measure, but on the contrary it is compensated by the big
number and variety of news they forward (which increases the overlap of rating histories with any other
user, and hence the probability of being chosen as a leader by that user). Finally, for J (0F ) (and J (3) which
features li in the denominator of the second term) users with small h are without followers—as a result of the
previous discussion. Moving further, naturally precision is always better for users with high h, who are less
demanding. Recall instead has the opposite trend: demanding users with small h are potentially interested
in a few news, which they easily get from well-chosen leaders, whereas users with big h would be interested
in many more news, but still have the same finite receiving capability.
Finally we plot in figure 3 the probability distributions of precision and recall values for individual users.
We observe that in the homogeneous setting these distribution have a well defined peak, whereas in the
heterogeneous setting p and 1 − β values vary more among users. This represents a natural (and expected)
outcome of the particular way to model users’ tastes.
4 Testing on real data
In this section, we test the similarity measures presented in Sec. 2.1 on real data. To this end, we employ
users’ assessments from two online rating platforms to build two corresponding leader-follower networks for
social recommendation (in the spirit of the model presented in this work), and examine if the results obtained
by artificial simulations can be recovered from real users’ preferences.
The dataset that we consider are from:
• MovieLens,6 a movie recommendation website in which users can rate movies to get personalized
recommendations. The dataset that we analyze is freely available at www.grouplens.org, and consists
of over 1,000,000 anonymous ratings on approximately 3,900 movies made by about 6,000 MovieLens
users since year 2000. The rating system is integer, with scale from 1 (worst) to 5 (best).
• Netflix,7 the world’s largest online movie rental service where users can rate the movies they watch.
The dataset that we analyze is freely provided for the Netflix Prize (http://www.netflixprize.com), and
consists of over 100,000,000 ratings from about 480,000 anonymous Netflix customers on 17,000 movie
titles. Again, ratings are integers from 1 to 5.
For each dataset, and for each similarity measure, we use the ratings given by users to build a leader-follower
network: each user selects as leaders L = 10 other users which are the most similar to her. Since the sim-
ilarity definitions in Sec. 2.1 are based on binary assessments (like/dislike), in order to restore this setting
we regard ratings 4 and 5 as likes and ratings 1, 2, 3 as dislikes. In this way, we have almost the same
number of likes and dislikes for each dataset. Note also that the process of selecting for each user the most
similar leaders is rather demanding, requiring approximately U ×M operations (here M is the total number
of ratings). We hence restrict our analysis to subsets of 1,000 randomly selected users. For Netflix, we also
consider only 4,000 randomly selected movies (and respective ratings). We then average our results over
6http://www.movielens.org
7http://www.netflix.com
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Table 6: Properties of the artificial leader-follower networks and quality of the recommendations (results
are averaged over independent subset selections). Values of de, p and 1 − β are percentages. The precision
values can be compared to the precisions of recommending at random (i.e. the percentages of likes among
the ratings), which are 61.7% for MovieLens and 59.8% for Netflix.
Movielens Netflix
r de p 1− β r de p 1− β
s(0) 0.25 11.7 77.7 79.8 0.26 20.1 76.2 82.9
J (0) 0.21 27.3 70.7 52.0 0.24 10.8 66.8 57.0
J (1) 0.22 24.2 70.3 52.4 0.24 14.0 65.5 57.4
J (2) 0.15 18.6 71.4 49.9 0.22 7.7 67.4 54.0
J (3) 0.14 33.5 71.1 49.6 0.21 11.5 66.2 55.6
s(0L) 0.22 38.3 76.2 59.9 0.23 26.1 82.9 61.4
s(0F ) 0.18 4.0 69.0 64.2 0.23 3.8 63.4 71.7
J (0L) 0.22 37.8 78.4 59.0 0.27 22.6 82.2 69.0
J (0F ) 0.13 17.0 69.0 65.1 0.16 5.5 62.9 72.6
K(1L) 0.24 29.4 74.4 59.5 0.22 21.5 78.2 66.9
K(1F ) 0.07 30.6 69.4 81.0 0.08 9.6 73.6 77.0
K(2L) 0.17 40.6 88.1 55.7 0.24 24.3 96.1 66.8
K(2F ) 0.15 43.5 86.8 54.7 0.18 12.7 92.8 64.4
K(3L) 0.16 41.9 78.5 57.2 0.21 21.9 80.4 67.4
K(3F ) 0.17 44.3 79.3 57.1 0.24 17.8 80.4 67.6
various independent selections of the subsets.
After the social network of users is constructed, movie recommendations for a given user are directly given
as the movies liked by her leaders (we have this information from the real data itself). Note that in order
to produce enough recommendations, we do not consider if in reality the user has rated a movie before her
leaders, or if a movie recommended from a leader actually come from this leader’s leaders, and we do not
consider damping effects. In other words, we use the leader-follower network to have a single-step spreading
system, in which every movie liked by a user in reality is recommended to her followers. We then obtain
precision and recall for these recommendations. As before, precision is the ratio of good recommendations
(i.e., recommendations for the movies that users liked in reality) to the total number of recommendations
for the movies liked or disliked by users in reality, whereas recall is the ratio of good recommendations to
the total number of movies liked in reality by users.
Table 6 reports the properties of the constructed social networks and of the recommendations for the two
datasets, and Figure 4 shows the leadership structure of the networks. We immediately notice that the
degree distributions are broad and the reciprocity values are relatively low (compared to the values of Table
3)—even with a symmetric measure s(0). As a consequence, there are many dead ends in the network. This
kind of structure recalls the heterogeneous case more than the homogeneous one (cf. Table 3). Note that
the differences between results from agent-based simulations and empirical findings (lower reciprocity and
broader degree distribution in the latter case) can be attributed to the fact that the real scenario is even
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function of the number of users’ followers for MovieLens and Netflix.
more heterogeneous than what the heterogeneous setting is supposed to model: real users are diverse not
only in their particular tastes and scopes of interest, but also in their behavior, features, social influence,
and many other factors. For instance, by introducing users’ heterogeneity in usage frequency and evaluation
noise (as in [21], but see also [22]), one observes a degree distribution which is very broad or even scale-free.
As for recommendation metrics, we confirm that also for real data K(2L) and K(2F ) are best in preci-
sion, whereas s(0) is best for recall. The gap in precision between K(2L) and s(0) suggests that asymmetric
and heterogeneous tastes better describe users’ preferences. Finally, for K(1F ) we notice a peculiar behavior
that we do not observe in simulations: it produces the longest tails of P (k), few dead ends and very low reci-
procity. The high value of recall obtained in this case can be attributed to this particular network structure.
Finally, we plot in figure 5 the probability distributions of precision and recall values for individual users in
the real datasets. Both for Movielens and Netflix, we observe that these distributions are broad, suggesting
again that the heterogeneous vector setting represents a better way to model real users’ tastes.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have studied the role of taste similarity in social networks where social recommendation is
at work. Building on the adaptive model of social recommendation introduced in [15], we introduced two
settings for modeling users’ tastes, and used agent-based modeling to study the evolution and properties
of the system under these different settings. After cross-checking our results with real data, we concluded
that modeling users with different scopes of interests produces results closer to those obtained from real user
actions.
Besides modeling users’ tastes, we tackled in this work also the complementary issue of quantifying taste
similarity from users’ actions. We investigated several definitions of users’ similarity both in agent-based
simulations and in real data, revealing which definitions are more reliable in measuring taste similarity, and
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Figure 5: Probability distributions for individual users’ precision (upper panels) and recall (lower panels)
values for Movielens and Netflix.
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more effective in constructing leader-follower networks for social recommendation. In particular, we showed
that asymmetric similarities are able to reveal if a user is more or less demanding than another, and generally
yield better results. In addition, we discussed which sets of actions are more appropriate to consider when
building a taste similarity that can enhance both precision and recall of the social recommendation process.
We remark that in our model we neglect some aspects of the dynamics of social recommendation and
user behavior. For instance, real users are not infallible and thus they can commit mistakes in selecting their
leaders. At the same time, each user can have her own selection criteria (i.e., her own similarity metric).
Both these interesting aspects would require extensive consideration, and will be addressed in future works.
Finally, our model assumes a passive relationship between leader and follower, with the latter interested
to select the former by homophily. The issue of whether leaders might have an active role in changing
the preferences of their followers by interacting with them is not discussed at all in this paper; in other
words, we consider the time scale of eventual changes of preferences to be much larger than the lifespan of
a leader-follower interaction, so that users’ preferences remain unaltered. Extending our model to include
more interactive relationships constitutes a fascinating research direction that we will pursue in the future.
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